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IDENTIFYING THE OCCURRENCE OR NON OCCURRENCE
OF COGNITIVE BIAS IN SITUATIONS
RESEMBLING THE MONTY HALL PROBLEM
FATEMEH BORHANI AND EDWARD J. GREEN
Abstract. People reason heuristically in situations resembling inferential puz-
zles such as Bertrand’s box paradox and the Monty Hall problem. The practi-
cal significance of that fact for economic decision making is uncertain because
a departure from sound reasoning may, but does not necessarily, result in a
“cognitively biased” outcome different from what sound reasoning would have
produced. Criteria are derived here, applicable to both experimental and non-
experimental situations, for heuristic reasoning in an inferential-puzzle situa-
tions to result, or not to result, in cognitively bias. In some situations, neither
of these criteria is satisfied, and whether or not agents’ posterior probability
assessments or choices are cognitively biased cannot be determined.
1. Introduction
People use heuristic reasoning in decision situations, and thus potentially make
“cognitively biased” decisions that deviate from what they would have done if they
had reasoned soundly. This article concerns conditions under which a particular
type of heuristic Bayesian inference will, or will not, deviate from sound inference
in a situation, and provides examples of plans (that is, patterns of evidence-based
choices) that result from sound inference in some situations, and from heuristic
inference in others, while being demonstrably inconsistent with the other sort of
reasoning. This explicit concern with demonstrability (with identifiability, in sta-
tistical or econometric parlance), rather than with the simple occurrence or non
occurence of cognitive bias, may distinguish the present research with respect to
behavioral-economics research on the whole.
The paradigmatic situation to be studied is the “box paradox” formulated by
Bertrand (1889, p. 2). Gardner (1959) and others have subsequently formulated
isomorphic problems. Bar-Hillel and Falk (1982) recognized and elucidated the sig-
nificance of those problems for cognitive psychology. Shimojo and Ichikawa (1989)
conducted a pioneering cognitive-psychology experiment to understand better the
logic of the heuristic reasoning by which people analyze such situations. Selvin
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(1975), inspired by an eponymous television producer’s adaptation of such a sit-
uation for entertainment, formulated the “Monty Hall problem”.1 The distinctive
feature of this problem is that a person is required to make a utility-maximizing
choice among a set of alternate gambles, rather than to express a numerical prob-
ability judgment. That is, it is a “behavioralistic” (in the sense of Savage (1972))
version of the box paradox. Granberg and Brown (1995), followed by Friedman
(1998) and others, have used that problem as the basis for an experimental proto-
col.
The experiments that have just been mentioned, are designed to show a de-
tectable, observable outcome from which an unobservable cause can be inferred.
The outcome is an incorrect probability assessment or a biased decision, and the
cause is the subject’s use of heuristic reasoning rather than of sound reasoning. The
import of the experiments is that, even though the outcomes of heuristic reasoning
are typically not detectable by casual observation of non-experimental situations
(but, rather, require an insightfully designed experimental protocol to become ap-
parent), heuristic reasoning is presumably endemic in everyday situations.
Heuristic reasoning is called ‘heuristic’ for a reason: that in some, albeit not all,
cases that it is employed, it providentially leads to correct or approximately correct
conclusions. Thus, that people endemically employ heuristic inductive logic does
not necessarily imply that faulty posterior-probability assessments or misguided
choices are endemic.2 The program of this article is to examine, in the specific
context of situations resembling the box paradox and the Monty Hall problem,
what are the characteristics of situations in which outcomes (posterior-probability
assessments or choices) are, or are not, informative about whether cognitive bias
has occurred. That is, the goal is to distinguish among three types of situation.
Type 1 In some situations, including experiments, some outcomes may be observed
that demonstrably reflect heuristic reasoning and are inconsistent with
sound reasoning. That is, persons (or agents) making those choices ex-
hibit cognitive bias.
Type 2 There may also be situations in which heuristic reasoning will lead demon-
strably to the same outcome as sound reasoning would have produced, given
identical probability beliefs regarding potentially observable events. That
is, even if the agent is reasoning heuristically, no cognitive bias will result
from it.
Type 3 Finally, there may be situations in which some observable outcome can be
imputed to heuristic reasoning by making one set of assumptions about the
agent’s beliefs (and about utilities of available alternatives, if the outcome
is a choice or decision), but different assumptions about the agent lead to
the conclusion that the same outcome has resulted from sound reasoning.
That is, given that outcome, although there is cognitive bias if the first set
of assumptions is correct, the bias is not demonstrable because the alternate
set of assumptions cannnot be ruled out.
1Mark Feldman has mentioned to the authors that the Monty Hall problem is isomorphic to
the situation of “restricted choice” in the game of bridge.
2Contemplating heuristic reasoning broadly, some researchers (such as Simon (1955)) have been
inclined to believe that such cognitive bias is endemic in fact, and that experimental situations are
exceptional only in point of the bias being demonstrable. Others (such as Friedman (1953)) have
leaned toward the view that providential outcomes are normal, and that experimental situations
are exceptional because cognitive bias occurs at all.
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Sections 2 and 3 are devoted to formalizing a broad class of situations resembling
the box paradox and Monty Hall problem, and to articulating what it means for
heuristic reasoning to be justified by sound reasoning in such a situation. Propo-
sition 1 (in section 4) provides a criterion for posterior beliefs reached by heuristic
reasoning to be justifiable by sound reasoning, if specific prior beliefs are imputed
to the agent. But the criterion does not rule out the possibility that those beliefs
are cognitively biased outcomes of different prior beliefs. That is, a situation that
meets the criterion might be of either type 2 or type 3. The trichotomy of situa-
tions is studied further in sections 5 and 6. Proposition 2 (in section 6) provides
conditions that are sufficient (and, under an auxilliary assumption, necessary) for a
situation to be of one or another of the three types. Section 7 concerns the “behav-
ioralistic” framework, in which outcomes of reasoning are taken to be choices rather
than posterior-probability assessments. This framework invokes more parsimonious
assumptions about what is observable to a researcher than the “verbalistic” frame-
work of sections 3–6 makes. Not surprisingly, it becomes more difficult to infer from
outcomes how an agent has reasoned. Nonetheless, example 4 exhibits a pattern
of choices that can only arise as an outcome of sound reasoning, while example 6
exhibits a pattern that can only result from heuristic reasoning (and thus is cogni-
tively biased).
2. An example of heuristic inference
Here we formulate, and analyze in ad hoc terms, an example of the sort of
heuristic inference that is the subject of this article.3 It illustrates the type of
bias that is routinely observed in the performance of subjects in cognitive-science
experiments.4
2.1. The broken-fuel-gauge (BFG) problem. Your car has a broken fuel gauge.
It always shows either ‘Full’ or ‘Empty’. When the tank is more than 70% full, the
gauge always shows ‘Full’. When the tank is less than 30% full, the gauge always
shows ‘Empty’. In between, the gauge might be in either state.
You have been on vacation—away from your car—for a month. You no longer
recall how far you drove after last having filled the tank. Before reading the gauge,
your beliefs about the amount of fuel in the tank correspond to a uniform distribu-
tion.
When you look, the gauge shows ‘Empty’. What is now your degree of belief
that the tank is at most 30% full? In the notation of probability theory, what is
P [Tank is ≤ 30% full | ‘Empty’]?
3The example is formulated to avoid some features of the Monty Hall problem that
Granberg and Brown (1995) and Friedman (1998) have identified as being related to other biases—
involving revisions of choices and breaking of indifference among alternatives—to which some sub-
jects’ performance might be imputed. The relationship between the example and the Monty Hall
problem will be examined in section 7.3.
4Early studies, such as those of Granberg and Brown (1995) and Friedman (1998) established
that about 90% of subjects initially give biased responses that would be derived from the heuristic
analysis to be specified below, and that roughly 50% of subjects persist in giving those responses af-
ter many repetitions of the problem. Subsequent studies, such as the one by Kluger and Friedman
(2010) and those that they cite, establish that some experimental treatments can reduce the in-
cidence of cognitively biased responses, but not dramatically so.
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2.2. Heuristic analysis. Let Fx denote the event that the tank is at most x%
full. Then P (Fx) = x/100.
The heuristic analysis of the BFG problem is based on the assumption that the
gauge showing ‘Empty’ corresponds to F70. Of course, there are other assumptions
that an agent might conceivably substitute for the more complex and subtle as-
sumtion that sound reasoning would require, but this particular assumption is one
that succeeds in accounting for way that experimental subjects tend to respond to
such situations.
To an agent who reasons heuristically, then, a particular configuration of the
gauge denotes the set of states of nature in which the gauge can possibly be in that
configuration. If you reason heuristically, then, when asked what is P [F30|‘Empty’],
you interpret that conditional probability as being P [F30|F70]. By Bayes’s rule,
(1) P [F30|F70] =
P (F30 ∩ F70)
P (F70)
=
P (F30)
P (F70)
=
3
7
2.3. Sound analysis. A conceptually correct, or sound, analysis of the BFG prob-
lem proceeds according to the logic articulated by Harsanyi (1967). This analysis
emphasizes that your having observed the tank to show ‘Empty’ is a fact about
you, rather than being per se a fact about the tank or its contents. Whether the
gauge shows ‘Empty’ or ‘Full’ determines your type.5
Your type is random, from an ex ante point of view. This randomness is modeled
as a type-valued function τ : Φ → {‘Empty’, ‘Full’}, where Φ is the set of states of
the world. The gauge showing ‘Empty’ (and you observing that fact) corresponds
to the event that the state of the world is in τ−1(‘Empty’). Thus, in contrast to
the heuristic analysis, P [F30|‘Empty’] means P [F30|τ−1(‘Empty’)].
(2) P [F30|τ
−1(‘Empty’)] =
P (F30 ∩ τ−1(‘Empty’))
P (τ−1(‘Empty’))
=
P (F30)
P (τ−1(‘Empty’))
Note that τ−1(‘Empty’) = F30 ∪ (τ−1(‘Empty’) ∩ (F70 \ F30)). Implicit in the
specification that “The gauge might show either ‘Empty’ or ‘Full’ in event F70,” is
the idea that P (τ−1(‘Empty’) ∩ (F70 \ F30)) < P (F70 \ F30).
6 Therefore,
(3) P [F30|τ
−1(‘Empty’)] >
P (F30)
P (F70)
=
3
7
In conclusion, comparing (1) and (3) shows that the sound analysis yields a
higher answer than the heuristic analysis does to the question about your posterior
belief that the tank is truly near empty after having observed ‘Empty’.
3. Models of evidence and of beliefs
Two types of structures will be defined in this section, and how they apply to the
BFG problem will be explained. A model of evidence formalizes heuristic Bayesian
inference. A model of beliefs formalizes sound Bayesian inference. According to a
model of beliefs, the agent reasons introspectively about the grounds for his/her
5When this example is formalized below, a third type—corresponding to you not having yet
observed the gauge (and thus holding your prior beliefs)—will be added. That change will not
affect the present calculation.
6This idea is formalized for heuristic reasoning in the third clause of condition (7) below. By
condition (20), the idea extends to sound reasoning also.
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beliefs. That is, the agent asks, what determines the relationship of its own cog-
nitive state to the objective facts about the world? An agent whose reasoning is
represented by a model of evidence, is not introspecting. Rather, the agent is think-
ing solely in terms of objective events. Within each framework, the agent revises
beliefs (that is, subjective probabilities) according to Bayes’s rule. The question
to be addressed is under what conditions a model of evidence reflects—that is, is
justified by—a model of beliefs.
3.1. Model of evidence. A model of evidence is a structure, (Ω,O, P, E), where
(4) Ω comprises the states of nature
(5) O is a σ-field of objective events on Ω
(6) P : O → [0, 1] is a countably additive probability measure
(7) E ⊆ O comprises the evidential events.
• E is countable
• B ∈ E =⇒ P (B) > 0
• [B ∈ E and C ∈ E and C 6⊆ B] =⇒ P (C \B) > 0
• Ω ∈ E
•
⋃
(E \ {Ω}) = E
Clearly an agent requires no evidence to be certain that ω ∈ Ω. It will be
convenient to have a notation for the non-trivial evidential events, that is, for those
in E \ {Ω}. Define
(8) E ′ = E \ {Ω}
The assumptions made in condition (7) reflect the focus of this article. Notably
the assumptions that P (B) > 0 and that P (C \B) > 0 simplify the analysis of the
specific cognitive bias studied here, to which subtle questions that arise concerning
conditioning on events of prior probability zero have no apparent relevance. That is,
although questions regarding how to extend conditional probability to conditioning
events of prior probability zero are crucial for some issues in game theory, they are
arcane in the context of belief revision and choice by a single agent.
It is assumed that E is countable because, otherwise, that P (B) > 0 for every
B ∈ E would be impossible.7
The assumption that Ω ∈ E is a convention that will play a role in defining what
it means for a model of beliefs to justify a model of evidence. E ′ is actually the
set of entities that formalizes the intuitive notion of a non-trivial evidential event.
In principle, there might be some state of the world for which no corroborating
evidence could possibly be found. That is, conceivably
⋃
E ′ 6= Ω. A condition,
balancedness, will be defined in section 4.1, that will fail if P (
⋃
E ′) < 1. Proposition
1 will assert that balancedness of a model of evidence is a necessary and sufficient
condition for there to be some model of beliefs that justifies it. Thus it is known that
if, the definition of a model of evidence were relaxed to permit that P (
⋃
E ′) < 1,
then such model would represent a situation of type 1 (in the taxonomy of the
introduction). But, rather than complicate the exposition of proposition 1 and
other results by explicit consideration of that possibility of un-corroborable states
7It would be possible to define a more general structure that would not require E to be count-
able, analogously to the way that full-support probability distributions on continuously distributed
random variables are defined in probability theory, but to do so would greatly complicate the
mathematical arguments to be made here without making a corresponding conceptual gain.
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of the world (and to avoid arcane complications of dealing with probability-zero
events), it has been stipulated that
⋃
E ′ = Ω.
As usual in Bayesian decision theory, the probability space, (Ω,O, P ) models
an agent’s prior beliefs. The events in E ′ model observations that the agent might
make, on the basis of which evidence the agent would form posterior beliefs. Those
beliefs are formed by conditionalization, where conditional probability,
P : O × E → [0, 1] is defined as usual:8
(9) P [A|B] =
P (A ∩B)
P (B)
Let’s see how the heuristic analysis of the BFG problem is formalized as a model
of evidence. The description of the problem in section 2.2 is made more simple
here, by assuming that there are just three states of nature, Ω = {e, h, f}. State
e represents the situation that the fuel tank is nearly empty (0 ≤ x < 30 in the
setting of section 2.2); h represents the situation that the fuel tank is half full
(30 ≤ x < 70); and f represents the situation that the fuel tank is nearly full
(70 ≤ x ≤ 100).
Example 1. Define (Ω,O, P, E) as follows. Ω = {e, h, f} and O = 2Ω. By ad-
ditivity, P is defined by the probabilities of singleton events in O. Specify that
P ({e}) = P ({f}) = 0.3 and that P ({h}) = 0.4. There are two non-trivial eviden-
tial events: E = {e, h} and F = {h, f}. E = {Ω,E ,F}.
Note that, corresponding to (1) in section 2.2, P [{e} |E ] = 3/7.
3.2. Model of beliefs. Harsanyi (1967) introduced a structure that he called a
beliefs space, which consists of a probability space, (Φ,B, Q) and a type mapping,
τ : Φ → T , where T is an abstract set. The elements of Φ are states of the world
and the elements of T are types of the agent. The types in Harsanyi’s structure, per
se, are nothing but arbitrary labels. What is meaningful are the inverse images,
τ−1(t), of the types. These information sets partition the states of the world. In
the event that an agent is of type t, then the agent’s posterior belief regarding an
event, C, is Q[C|τ−1(t)], where Q : B × τ−1(T ) → [0, 1] is defined analogously to
(9).
A model of beliefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), is a slight variant of a beliefs space.
(10) Ω comprises the states of nature. E ⊂ 2Ω \ {∅} is countable. Ω =
⋃
E ′ ∈ E .
(11) Φ comprises the states of the world. B is a σ-field on Φ and Q : B → [0, 1]
is a countably additive probability measure.
(12) The type function, τ : Φ→ E ′, maps Φ onto E ′. Ω is called the prior-beliefs
type, and elements of E ′ are called posterior-beliefs types.9
(13) τ−1(B) ∈ B and 0 < Q(τ−1(B)) < 1
It will be convenient to extend τ−1, the inverse correspondence of τ , to a corre-
spondence, β : E → B.
(14) φ ∈ β(B) ⇐⇒ [B = Ω or τ(φ) = B]
8Throughout this article, A should be interpreted to range over all of O, and B to range only
over E, absent a statement to the contrary.
9This nomenclature corresponds to standard terminology in decision theory regarding a single
agent. In game theory, probability assessments conditioned on a player’s type are generally called
interim beliefs.
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It is a trivial formal change of Harsanyi’s framework to specify that the agent’s
types are sets of states of nature rather than being arbitrary labels, and to introduce
a new type that is not realized in any state of the world. Nonetheless, this modifi-
cation enables a model of evidence and a beliefs space to be compared explicitly as
representations of Bayesian inference. Before framing a systematic comparison in
the next section, let’s see how a model of belief contrasts with a model of evidence
as a representation of inference in the BFG problem. The intuition behind the
formalization of the BFG problem as a model of beliefs is as follows. Ω, P , and E
are as in example 1. Type Ω represents the agent’s prior beliefs, while types E and
F represent posterior beliefs after having observed the gauge to show ‘Empty’ and
‘Full’ respectively. Conditionally on the state of nature being e or f , if the agent’s
type is not Ω, then it must be E or F respectively. However, if the state of nature
is h and the agent’s type is not Ω, then the type may be either E or F . Assume
that, conditionally on the state of nature being h and the agent’s type not being
Ω, the other two types are equally probable.
Example 2. Let (Ω,B, P, E) be as in example 1. Φ = Ω× E ′ = {e, h, f}× {E ,F}.
B = 2Φ. Q is specified according to the following table. Each cell of the table
is a probability. The column labeled ‘Ω’ shows marginal probabilities of Q on Ω.
The cell in the row labeled ‘ω’ and the column labeled ‘B’, for B ∈ E ′, shows the
probability of the corresponding state of the world, (ω,B).
(15)
Q(ω,B) Ω E F
e .3 .3 0
h .4 .2 .2
f .3 0 .3
The type function is defined by τ(ω,B) = B for all ω ∈ Ω and B ∈ E ′. Note that
Q(A × Ω) = P (A) for all A ∈ O, where P is the probability measure constructed
in example 1.
If A is a set of states of nature, then the event that the state of nature is in A is
A×E ′ ∈ B. Thus, as explained above, the posterior probability held by an agent of
type B ∈ E ′ that the state of nature is in A is Q[A×E ′|β(B)]. In particular, taking
A = {e} and B = E , the agent’s posterior probability that the state of nature is
e is 3/5. Since it has been shown that P [{e} |E ] = 3/7 in example 1, the formal
representations of the BFG problem via a model of evidence and a model of belief
reproduce the overall conclusion, inequality (3), of section 2.2.
3.3. Reflection/justification. In the context of comparing examples 1 and 2, it
was just suggested that A×E ′ is the event in B that is associated with a set, A ∈ O,
of states of nature. In fact, this association defines an isomorphism, A 7→ A×E ′, of
O with a sub σ-field of B in the example. Capitalizing on this idea, the relationship
between a model of evidence and a model of beliefs that was implicitly defined in
that discussion can be stated in an explicit and general way.
In order to make this generalization, an isomorphism of probability spaces must
be defined in a slightly more permissive way than the obvious one. In the preceding
paragraph, ‘isomorophism’ was used in the obvious way, to denote a mapping that
preserves Boolean relationships among sets. However, in general—when the situa-
tion does not have the convenient feature that the domain of the isomorphism is a
Cartesian factor of its range—such an exact relationship may not hold. Rather, if
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(Ξ, C, R) and (Ψ,D, S) are probability spaces, then define α : C → D to be a measure
isomorphism from (Ξ, C, R) to (Ψ,D, S) iff the following conditions hold.10
(16)
For every C ∈ C, S(α(C)) = R(C)
For every countable F ⊆ C, S
(
α
(⋃
F
)
△
⋃
{α(B) | B ∈ F}
)
= 0
For every D ∈ D, there exists C ∈ C such that Q(D△α(C)) = 0
Throughout the remainder of this article, isomorphism refers to a measure iso-
morphism. When the full specifications of (Ξ, C, R) and (Ψ,D, S) are clear from
context, α will be called an isomorphism from C to D.
Let Ω ∈ E ⊆ 2Ω \ {∅}. A model of beliefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), conforms to a model
of evidence, (Ω,O, P, E), via α : O → B iff
(17) For some sub σ-field, C, of B, α : O → B is a measure isomorphism from
(Ω,O, P ) to (Φ, C, Q ↾ C), and
(18) For all B ∈ E , β(B) ⊆ α(B)
A model of evidence, (Ω,O, P, E), reflects a model of beliefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ),
(equivalently, the model of beliefs justifies the model of evidence) via α : O → B
under the following conditions.11
(19) (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), conforms to (Ω,O, P, E), via α, and
(20) For all A ∈ O and B ∈ E , Q[α(A)|β(B)] = P [A|B]
Note that, when this relationship holds, there is a clear reason to view the agent’s
types as being evidential events rather than mere abstract labels. The agent’s type
is the most specific objective event (not only the most specific evidential event)
that the agent believes to obtain almost surely. That is, for any A ∈ O and B ∈ E ,
Q(β(B) \ α(B)) = 0 and, if P (A) < P (B), then Q(β(B) \ α(A)) > 0.
Condition (20) is central to this article, because it formalizes what it means for
cognitive bias not to occur. An agent is envisioned to have authentic probability
beliefs, either fully articulated or inchoate, that are represented by a model of be-
liefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ). With respect to the events in some sub σ-field of B, at least,
the agent’s beliefs are envisioned to be fully articulated. Specifically it is envisioned
that there is a model of evidence, (Ω,O, P, E), such that (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) conforms
to (Ω,O, P, E) via some measure isomorphism, α, and that the agent’s authentic
probability beliefs about events in the image of O under α are fully articulated.
That is, condition (19) is satisfied. What determines whether or not (Ω,O, P, E)
reflects (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), is condition (20). If (20) is not satisfied, then (Ω,O, P, E)
does not reflect (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ). Intuitively that is the case in which, if the agent
reasons heuristically according to the model of evidence, (Ω,O, P, E), then the agent
exhibits cognitive bias relative to sound inference from authentic beliefs (that is,
relative to inference based soundly on the model of beliefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) ).
Claim 1. The model of evidence in example 1 does not reflect any model of beliefs.
The model of beliefs in example 2 does not justify any model of evidence.
Proof. Suppose that α : O → B satisfies conditions (17) and (19), and that ei-
ther (Ω,O, P, E) is the model of evidence in example 1 or else (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ)
10Definition (16) is tantamount to the definition of a measure isomorphism given by Sikorski
(1969, p. 202).
11Subsequently, unless specific information about α is important to a discussion, “via α” will
sometimes not stated explicitly, although conditions stated in terms of α may be invoked.
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is the model of beliefs in example 2. In either case, P (E ) = P (F ) = 7/10 and
P ({h}) = 4/10. so P [{h} |E ] = P [{h} |F ] = 4/7. Since (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) is a
model of beliefs, 0 < min{β(E ), β(F )} and {β(E ), β(F )} partitions Φ. Therefore
{α({h}) ∩ β(E ), α({h}) ∩ β(F )} partitions α({h}).
A contradiction will be derived from the assumption that condition (20) is also
satisfied (that is, that (Ω,O, P, E) reflects (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ)). Since P [{h} |F ] =
4/7, condition (20) requires that Q(α({h}) ∩ β(F )) = 4Q(F )/7 > 0. Therefore
Q(α({h}) ∩ β(E )) < Q(α({h})). Then, by (19),
(21)
Q[α({h})|β(E )] = Q(α({h}) ∩ β(E ))/Q(β(E ))
< Q(α({h}))/Q(β(E )) = P ({h})/P (E ) = P [{h} |P (E )]
This contradicts (20). 
A fact about conformity, to be used later in the proof of proposition 2, is stated
and proved now.
Lemma 1. For every model of evidence, there is a conforming model of beliefs.
Proof. Consider a model of evidence, Ω,O, P, E). Let 〈Bs〉s∈S enumerate E
′. (S =
{1, . . . , n} if E ′ has n elements, and S = {1, 2, 3 . . .} if E ′ is infinite.) Let t =∑
s∈S 2
−s. Define Φ = Ω× E ′ and B = Σ(O × 2E
′
).12 Begin to define Q by Q(A×
Bs) = 2
−sP (A)/t. This definition extends by countable additivity to Σ(O× 2E
′
).13
Define µ : Ω→ S by µ(ω) = min {s | ω ∈ B(s)}, and define τ : Φ→ E ′ by
(22) τ(ω,B) =
{
B if ω ∈ B
Bµ(ω) if ω /∈ B
Define α : O → B by α(A) = A × E ′. It is routinely verified that (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ)
is a model of beliefs that conforms to (Ω,O, P, E) via α. 
4. When does some model of beliefs justify a model of evidence?
In this section, a necessary and sufficient condition will be derived for a model
of evidence to reflect some model of beliefs. To set the stage, let us point out
a feature of the BFG problem that seems to be conducive for cognitive bias to
occur. Consider the model of beliefs presented in example 2. There are only 2
posterior-beliefs types: E = {e, h} and F = {h, f}. The image of {h} under α is
split between β(E ) and β(F ). Its probability mass is correspondingly split in the
model of beliefs.
In contrast, α({e}) ⊆ β(E ) and α({f}) ⊆ β(F ). The probability mass of these
states of nature therefore is not split.
Reflection is impossible because probability mass of some states of nature, but
not others, must be split. This situation results from a particular state of nature
being in both E and F , while others are only in one of them. A state of nature
that belongs to more evidential events than others do, is under weighed relative
to those others by Q within the image under β of each of the evidential events to
which it belongs.
12If C ⊆ 2Φ, then Σ(C) is the smallest σ-field containing C.
13Specifically, this extension is a measure by Caratheodory’s theorem. (Cf.
Aliprantis and Border (2006, theorem 10.23)).
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Clearly this problem of under weighting cannot occur if E ′ is a partition of Ω.
The following example shows that, to avoid under weighting, it is not necessary for
E ′ to be a partition, or even for there to exist a partition of Ω by elements of E ′. A
condition that the example does satisfy, and that will be generalized below, is that
each state of nature belongs to the same number (3, in the example) of evidential
events.
Example 3. Define (Ω,B, P, E) by setting Ω = {0, 1, 2}, B = 2Ω, and P ({ω}) =
1/3, and by defining E ′ to be the set of two-element subsets of 2Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω,
define ω′ ≡ ω + 1 (mod 3) and ω′′ ≡ ω − 1 (mod 3), and define Eω = {ω, ω′}.
14
Define Ψ = {0, . . . , 5}, C = 2Ψ, and define R({ψ}) = 1/6 for each ψ. Let (Φ,B, Q)
be the product of (Ω,O, P ) and (Ψ, C, R). Using the unique representation of
ψ = 2j + k (with 0 ≤ j ≤ 2, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1), define τ by
(23) τ(ω, ψ) = Ei, where i =
{
ω, if k = 0
ω′′, if k = 1
There is no partition of Ω by elements of E ′. Nonetheless, defining α(A) = A×Ψ,
(Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) justifies (Ω,O, P, E).
4.1. Balancedness defined. Define (Ω,O, P, E) to be balanced iff, for some θ,
(24) θ : E ′ → (0, 1] and P
({
ω |
∑
ω∈B∈E′
θ(B) = 1
})
= 1
Call θ a balancing function (for P and E).
Note that, with χB : Ω→ {0, 1} being the indicator function of B, (24) is equiv-
alent to
(25) θ : E ′ → (0, 1] and P
({
ω |
∑
B∈E′
θ(B)χB(ω) = 1
})
= 1
By setting θ(B0) = θ(B1) = θ(B2) = 1/2, it is seen that the model of evidence
in example 3 is balanced. In contrast, for the model of evidence in example 1, if
θ : E → (0, 1), then
∑
h∈B θ(B)−
∑
e∈B θ(B) = θ(F ) > 0, so either
∑
h∈B θ(B) > 1
or
∑
e∈B θ(B) < 1 and therefore (24) cannot hold. In each of these two examples,
then, the model of evidence being balanced is equivalent to it reflecting some model
of beliefs.
4.2. Balancedness and the justifiability of a model of evidence. The fol-
lowing proposition follows immediately from the two lemmas that are subsequently
proved.
Proposition 1. A model of evidence is balanced if, and only if, it reflects some
model of beliefs.
Lemma 2. A model of evidence is balanced, if some model of belief justifies it.
14The states of nature and the evidential events in example 1 can be embedded in this structure
by assigning e 7→ 0, h 7→ 1, f 7→ 2, E 7→ B0, and F 7→ B1.
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Proof. Suppose that (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) justifies (Ω,O, P, E). By conditions (12), (13)
and (14), {β(B) | B ∈ E ′} is a measurable partition of Ψ. By (16), (17) and (20),
Q(α(A) ∩ β(B)) = P [A|B]Q(β(B)).
Define θ : E ′ → (0, 1] by
(26) θ(B) =
Q(β(B))
P (B)
Then
(27)
P (A) = Q(α(A)) =
∑
B∈E′
Q(α(A) ∩ β(B)) =
∑
B∈E′
P [A|B]Q(β(B))
=
∑
B∈E′
∫
A
χB
P (B)
Q(β(B)) dP =
∫
A
∑
B∈E′
θ(B)χB dP
Given that (27) holds for all A ∈ O, condition (25) is satisfied, so equation (26)
defines a balancing function. 
Lemma 3. If a model of evidence is balanced, then some model of beliefs justifies
it.
Proof. Let θ be a balancing function for a model of evidence, (Ω,O, P, E). A model
of beliefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), that justifies (Ω,O, P, E) is now constructed.
Let Ψ = [0, 1) and let C and R be the σ-field of Borel sets on Ψ and the Lebesgue
measure. Specify that Φ = Ω × Ψ, B = Σ(O × C), and Q = P × R. Define an
isomorphism, α : O → B, by
(28) α(A) = A×Ψ
Let 〈Bs〉s∈S enumerate E
′. For n ∈ {0} ∪ S, define
(29) g0(ω) = 0 and gn+1(ω) = gn(ω) + θ(Bn+1)χBn+1(ω)
If 〈xs〉s∈S is a sequence of numbers, then define lims→maxS xs = xmaxS if
S is finite and lims→maxS xs = lims→∞ xs if S is infinite. Define N = {ω |
lims→maxS gs(ω) 6= 1}. Since θ is a balancing function,
(30) P (N) = 0
Define τ : Φ→ E ′ by
(31) τ(ω, ψ) = Bs ⇐⇒
{
gs−1(ω) ≤ ψ < gs(ω) if s /∈ N
s = 1 if s ∈ N
From this definition, it follows that
(32)
{(ω, ψ) | ω ∈ Bs and gs−1(ω) ≤ ψ < gs(ω)} ⊆ β(Bs)
⊆ {(ω, ψ) | ω ∈ Bs and gs−1(ω) ≤ ψ < gs(ω)} ∪N
Then, from Fubini’s theorem and (30) and (32), it follows that, for all A ∈ O,
(33)
Q(α(A) ∩ β(Bs)) =
∫
A∩Bs
∫ gs(ω)
gs−1(ω)
1 dRdP
=
∫
A∩Bs
gs(ω)− gs−1(ω) dP = θ(Bs)P (A ∩Bs)
Conditions (30) and (32) and (33) imply that
(34) Q(β(Bs)) = Q(α(Bs) ∩ β(Bs)) = θ(Bs)P (Bs)
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so, for A ∈ O and B ∈ E ,
(35) Q[α(A)|β(B)] =
Q(α(A) ∩ β(B))
Q(B)
=
θ(B)P (A ∩B)
θ(B)P (B)
= P [A|B]
That is, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) justifies (Ω,O, P, E). 
5. Situations
An undefined term, situation, played an important role in the introductory dis-
cussion of alternate views about the import of psychological experiments for eco-
nomics. In this section, building on the framework introduced in the preceding
section, a situation will be formally defined.
In the introduction, it was mentioned that Shimojo and Ichikawa (1989) used a
situation isomorphic to Bertrand’s box paradox as the basis for an experiment to
exhibit subjects’ cognitive bias. In that situation, there are three states of nature.
Shimojo and Ichikawa stipulated that, given the way that the situation was de-
scribed to subjects in the experimental protocol, their prior beliefs would be that
each state of nature has probability 1/3. (That is, those would be the subjects’
probability assessments after having received the description of the situation, but
before having observed evidence that would be presented in the course of the ex-
periment.) However, those researchers did not make any assumption regarding a
subject’s beliefs about the correlation between the state of nature and the evidence
that would be observed. They did not need to make any such assumption, because
most subjects reported posterior probability assessments that were inconsistent
with any model of beliefs corresponding to the stipulated prior probability beliefs
about states of nature. That is, the outcomes of the experiment were generated by
a situation of type 1 according to the trichotomy presented in the introduction.
The idea of a “model of beliefs corresponding to the stipulated prior probabil-
ity beliefs about states of nature” is formalized by the definition of conformity.
Shomojo and Ichikawa’s assumptions about subjects’ beliefs regarding the states
of nature can be represented as a model of evidence. As has been discussed fol-
lowing the definition of reflection in the previous section, their discussion of their
experiment presupposed that each subject had authentic probability beliefs about
the state of the world that could be represented as some model of beliefs or other,
but they did not pretend to know anything about that model beyond the fact that
it conformed to the stipulated model of evidence. The general form of Shimojo
and Ichikawa’s way of thinking about their experiment is captured by the following
definition. That is, a situation is a structure that formally describes a researcher’s
assumptions regarding both the observable and unobservable aspects of a what that
researcher assumes to be a subject’s authentic prior-probability beliefs. Specifically,
the research assumes everything that is common to all of the models of belief in
the situation.
A situation is a structure, ((Ω,O, P, E),S), comprising a model of evidence
and a non empty set, S, of ordered pairs. Each element of S is of the form
((Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), α), where (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) is a model of beliefs that conforms
to (Ω,O, P, E) via α : O → B. Where no confusion will result from abuse of no-
tation, ‘S’ will be used to name the situation. Also, a statement such as “Some
model of beliefs in S justifies (Ω,O, P, E)” should be understood as “For some
((Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), α) ∈ S, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) justifies (Ω,O, P, E) via α.”
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As Shimojo and Ichikawa have done, a researcher may assume nothing at all
about a subject’s beliefs, except that those beliefs conform to the model of evidence
that is communicated in the experimental protocol. That situation is represented
by ((Ω,O, P, E),S), where (Ω,O, P, E), is communicated in the protocol and S
comprises all of the pairs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), α), such that (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) conforms
to (Ω,O, P, E) via α. Such a situation will be called full.
6. Characterizing the types of situation
In terms of the definition of a situation just given, the trichotomy discussed in
the introduction is formalized by
(36) ((Ω,O, P, E),S) is of type


1 if no model of beliefs in S
justifies (Ω,O, P, E)
2 if every model of beliefs in S
justifies (Ω,O, P, E)
3 otherwise
If (Ω,O, P, E) is a model of evidence, then define E ′ to be an almost sure partition
iff, for every pair of distinct elements, C and D, of E ′, P (C ∩D) = 0.
Proposition 2. Let ((Ω,O, P, E),S) be a situation. Then
(37) If situation S is not balanced, then it is of type 1.
(38) If situation S is full and of type 1, then it is not balanced.
(39) If E ′ is an almost sure partition, then situation S is of type 2.
(40) If situation S is full and of type 2, then E ′ is an almost sure partition.
(41) There exist situations of each of the three types.
Proof. Consider each of the claims.
[37] This follows from proposition 1.
[38] Equivalently, if situation S is full and balanced, then it is not of type 1.
Assume the antecedent. Because the situation is balanced, it reflects some model
of beliefs. Because the situation is full, that model of beliefs is in S. That is, the
situation is not of type 1.
[39] Suppose that E ′ is an almost sure partition and that ((Φ,B, Q, E , τ), α) ∈ S.
Since (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) conforms to (Ω,O, P, E), condition (18) holds. Together with
the fact that E ′ is an almost sure partition, (18) implies that, for every B ∈ E ′,
Q(α(B)△β(B)) = 0. It follows that (Ω,O, P, E) reflects (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ). Thefore
the situation is of type 2.
[40] Equivalently, if the situation is full and E ′ is not an almost sure partition,
then the situation is not of type 2. That is, in that case, there is some model of
beliefs, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ), in S that does not reflect (Ω,O, P, E). Since E ′ is not an
almost sure partition, there are two distinct elements of E ′, C and D, such that
P (C ∩D) > 0.
If the situation is not balanced, then it is of type 1 by (37), so assume that it
is balanced. Let θ be a balancing function. A model of evidence that conforms to
(Ω,O, P, E), but that does not justify (Ω,O, P, E), will be constructed. To do so,
let Φ, B, Q, τ , and the enumeration of E ′, 〈Bs〉s∈S , be as in the proof of lemma 3.
(Again, suppose that S = {1, . . . , n} if E ′ has n elements and that S = {1, 2, 3 . . .}
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if E ′ is infinite.) Without loss of generality, assume that P (B1 ∩B2) > 0 and that
B2 6⊆ B1. By (7), P (B2 \ B1) > 0. Since the situation is full, the situation to be
constructed is in S, so the situation cannot be of type 2.
To construct the model of beliefs, a type function, σ : Φ→ E ′, will be constructed.
Begin by noting that Q(Ω× [0, 1/2)) = 1/2. On Ω× [0, 1/2), σ will satisfy σ(ω, ψ) =
τ(ω, 2ψ). This specification ensures that, for each B ∈ E ′, 0 < Q(σ−1(B)) < 1 as
required by condition (13) of the definition of a model of beliefs. On Ω × [1/2, 1),
define σ to make β(B1) as large as condition (18) will permit
Specifically, define µ(ω) = min {s | ω ∈ Bs}, and define σ by
(42) σ(ω, ψ) =
{
τ(ω, 2ψ) if ψ < 1/2
Bµ(ω) otherwise
With β(B) = τ−1(B) and γ(B) = σ−1(B), note that
(43)
Q(γ(B2)) = Q((γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2))) ∪ ((γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [1/2, 1)))))
= Q((γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2)))) +Q(((B2 \B1)× (Ω× [1/2, 1))))
> Q((γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2))))
and
(44) α(B1 ∩B2) ∩ γ(B2) = α(B1 ∩B2) ∩ (γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2)))
Also note that, for all A ∈ O and B ∈ E ′,
(45) Q(α(A) ∩ (γ(B) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2)))) =
Q(α(A) ∩ β(B))
2
(and specifically, taking A = Ω, Q(γ(B) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2))) = Q(β(B))/2). Then
(46)
Q[α(B1 ∩B2)|γ(B2)] =
Q(α(B1 ∩B2) ∩ γ(B2))
Q(γ(B2))
<
Q(α(B1 ∩B2) ∩ (γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2))))
Q(γ(B2) ∩ (Ω× [0, 1/2)))
=
Q(α(B1 ∩B2) ∩ β(B2))
Q(β(B2))
= Q[α(B1 ∩B2)|β(B2)]
By the construction of (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) in lemma 3, Q[α(B1∩B2)|β(B2)] = P [B1∩
B2|B2]. Therefore, by (46), Q[α(B1 ∩ B2)|γ(B2)] < P [B1 ∩ B2|B2]. That is,
(Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , σ) conforms to (Ω,O, P, E) but it does not justify (Ω,O, P, E). Since
situation S is full, (Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , σ) ∈ S. Therefore, situation S is not of type 2.
[41] By lemma 1, there is a situation, and hence a full situation, corresponding to
every model of evidence. There are models of evidence that are not balanced, so,
by (37), there are full situations of type 1. There are models of evidence such that
E ′ is an almost sure partition, so, by (39), there are situations of type 2. Example
3 is a balanced model of evidence, for which E ′ is not an almost sure partition, so,
by (38) and (40), the full situation corresponding to that model of evidence is of
type 3. 
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7. Conditioning expected utility on evidence and beliefs
Shimojo and Ichikawa (1989) elicited subjects’ reports of their posterior beliefs.
They analyzed that data under the assumptions that (a) their experimental protocol
induced specific prior beliefs that the researchers intended subjects to hold, and
(b) subjects were capable of reporting precise numerical subjective probabilities of
events and were willing to report those probabilities truthfully.
When those assumptions do not hold, another approach must be taken. One
such approach, inspired by the characterization of subjective utility provided by
Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1972), is to infer subjects’ prior and posterior proba-
bility measures from data regarding their choices among alternatives offered in the
experiment.
Experimenters studying the Monty Hall problem, such as those of Granberg and Brown
(1995) and Friedman (1998), have adopted a hybrid approach. They have assumed
subjects to hold particular prior probabilities, but have inferred posterior proba-
bilities from observed choices. In principle, though, some of the reasons to prefer
choice-based imputation of posterior probabilities to subjects should apply to prior
probabilities also. Subjects could be given opportunities to make choices both
before and after having received evidence, with the former choices revealing infor-
mation about subjects’ prior beliefs and the latter ones revealing information about
posterior beliefs.
Such a thoroughly behavioralistic protocol will be considered now. The notion
of a plan, to be defined momentarily, will play a cognate role to that of a situation
in preceding sections. Essentially, subjects’ choices will be treated as statistics of
prior and posterior beliefs. To observe a statistic of a probability distribution is less
informative than to observe the distribution directly. Correspondingly, the precise
characterization of the various types of situation in proposition 2 will not have
a counterpart here. Nonetheless, example 4 will exhibit a plan that can only be
chosen by a subject who reasons according to a model of beliefs, while example 6
will exhibit a plan that can only be chosen by a subject who reasons according to
a model of evidence.
7.1. Plans and conditional expected utility. Consider an agent who may
choose from a set, A, of alternatives. Suppose that the set of feasible alterna-
tives does not depend on the state of nature. Let E be a set of evidential events.
(As specified in section 3.1, Ω ∈ E ⊆ O \ {∅} ⊆ 2Ω.) Intuitively, a plan is a corre-
spondence that assigns a non-empty set of alternatives to each evidential event.
A question that it would be typical to pose in decision theory is: what are
the conditions under which a plan, ζ : E ⇒ A, may represent an agent’s choices
according to maximization of conditional expected utility? That is, when can E be
associated with a probability space, and can state-contingent utilities be imputed
to the various alternatives, such that for each B, ζ(B) is the set of alternatives that
maximize expected utility conditional on B?
However, regarding the decisions of experimental subjects and of other agents,
there are really two questions. The probability space with respect to which condi-
tional probabilities are formed might be taken to be either a model of evidence or
else a model of beliefs. If a model of evidence, then the agent conditions on the
event itself. If a model of beliefs, then the agent conditions on the distinct event,
β(B), that the evidential event, B, is the agent’s type.
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The two questions are formulated explicitly as follows.
(47) Under what conditions on (Ω,O, E) and ζ do there exist a probability space,
(Ψ, C, P ), an isomorphism α : O → C, and a set of (bounded, O-measurable,
state-contingent) utility functions, 〈ua : Ψ→ R〉a∈A, such that, for all a ∈ A
and B ∈ E ,
(47.1)
∫
α(B)
ua dP = max
b∈A
∫
α(B)
ub dP ⇐⇒ a ∈ ζ(B)
That is, under what conditions do there exist a model of evidence,
(Ψ, C, P, α(E)), and a set of utility functions that rationalize ζ?
(48) Under what conditions on E and ζ do there exist a model of beliefs,
(Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) and a set of bounded utility functions, 〈va : Φ → R〉a∈A,
such that, for all a ∈ A and B ∈ E ,
(48.1)
∫
β(B)
va dQ = max
b∈A
∫
β(B)
vb dQ ⇐⇒ a ∈ ζ(B)
A model of evidence that satisfies the condition stated in (47) rationalizes ζ by
evidence. A model of beliefs that satisfies the condition stated in (48) rationalizes ζ
by beliefs. A plan that is rationalized by some model is called rational with respect
to that type of model.
The definition of rationalization by a model of beliefs shows why the prior-
beliefs type, Ω, is needed although it is not in the range of the type function. If the
definition of E were amended so that Ω /∈ E , then any plan could be rationalized
by beliefs. The reason is that, since {β(B) | B ∈ E ′} is a partition of Φ, functions
va can be defined by
(49) va(φ) =
{
1 if a ∈ ζ(τ(φ))
0 otherwise
However, because the definition of rationality with respect to beliefs requires that
(48) must be satisfied also by B = Ω, (49) does not automatically define util-
ity functions that rationalize ζ. This observation reflects the basic principle that
the force of Bayesian decision theory comes from the relationship between choices
based on prior versus posterior beliefs, not solely on relationships among choices
conditioned on alternate posterior beliefs.
Section 7.2 concerns an example of a plan that is rational with respect to be-
liefs, but not with respect to evidence. Section 7.3 concerns an example of a plan
that is rational with respect to evidence, but not with respect to beliefs. In fact,
this example formalizes the Monty Hall problem that has been studied in various
experiments cited earlier.
7.2. Rationality with respect to beliefs does not imply rationality with
respect to evidence. In this section, first a model of beliefs will be constructed
and will be shown to rationalize a plan. Then, it will be shown that no model of
evidence can rationalize that plan.
Example 4. The model of beliefs closely resembles example 2. It is based on a
model of evidence that differs from example 1 by the addition of a new evidential
event, H . Thus, let Ω = {e, h, f} and E = {Ω,E ,H ,F}, where E = {e, h},
F = {h, f}, and H = {h}. Besides the addition of H to E , the other change of the
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current example from from example 2 is to put greater weight on h than is specified
in that earlier example. The set of states of the world, Φ, of the model of beliefs
will be Ω × E ′, and prior beliefs will be specified so that Q({h} × E ′) = 3/5 and
Q({f} × E ′) = Q({e} × E ′) = 1/5.
The specification of the model of beliefs is completed by taking B = 2Φ, and
τ(ω,B) = B, and by fully specifying Q according to the following table. The cells
are interpreted as in table (15).
(50)
Q(ω,B) Ω E H F
e .2 .2 0 0
h .6 .1 .4 .1
f .2 0 0 .2
Since τ(ω,B) = B, β(B) = B × E ′. Specify A by A = {w, d}. Specify that
ζ(Ω) = ζ(H ) = {w} and ζ(E ) = ζ(F ) = {d}.
Claim 2. The plan specified in example 4 is rational with respect to beliefs, but not
with respect to evidence.
Proof. It will be shown that there are utility functions that, together with the
model of beliefs constructed in proposition 1, rationalize ζ in example 4. However,
ζ is not rational with respect to evidence.
Intuitively, w is supposed to be wagering that the state of nature is h and d
is supposed to be declining to wager. Formally suppose that, for all B ∈ E ′,
vw(h,B) = 10 and vw(e,B) = vw(f,B) = −10 and that, for all ω ∈ Ω, vd(ω) = 0.
Then
(51)
∫
β(Ω)
vw − vd dQ = 2 and
∫
β(H )
vw − vd dQ = 4 and∫
β(E)
vd − vw dQ =
∫
β(F)
vd − vw dQ = 1
so ζ is rational with respect to beliefs.
A contradiction will be obtained from supposing that some isomorphism, α : O →
C, model of evidence, (Ψ, C, R, α(E)), and set of utility functions, 〈ua : Ψ→ R〉a∈A,
rationalize ζ
(52)
ζ(E ) = {d}, so
∫
α(E)
ud − uw dR > 0
ζ(H ) = {w}, so
∫
α(H )
ud − uw dR < 0
thus
∫
α(E)\α(H )
ud − uw dR > 0
ζ(F ) = {w}, so
∫
α(F)
ud − uw dR > 0∫
α(Ω)
ud − uw dR =
∫
α(F)
ud − uw dR+
∫
α(E)\α(H )
ud − uw dR > 0
But, that
∫
α(Ω) ud − uw dR > 0 and ζ(Ω) = {w} contradicts condition (48.1) for
α, (Ψ, C, R, α(E)), and 〈ua〉a∈A to rationalize ζ. 
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7.3. Rationality with respect to evidence does not imply rationality with
respect to beliefs. The BFG problem is in what Savage (1972) called the “ver-
balistic” tradition, while the Monty Hall (MH) problem is in the “behavioralistic”
tradition. That is, the BFG problem is formulated in terms of eliciting first-person
reports of an agent’s probability assessments, while the MH problem is formulated
in terms of acquiring evidence about the pattern of the agent’s practically signif-
icant decisions. In a situation where it is possible to observe an agent’s choices
but not to query the agent about probability assessments, or where it is thought
that an agent’s responses to such queries will either over- or under-state the agent’s
capacity to act in conformity to expected-utility maximization, the MH problem
could be the more advantageous one to consider.
Of course, the BFG problem can be reformulated in a behavioralistic framework.
This will be done now. It will be shown that the plan that corresponds naturally
to heuristic reasoning is rational with respect to beliefs, as well as with respect
to evidence. Thus, in the situations just envisioned, the BFG problem cannot be
used to design an experiment, the outcome of which could rule out the possibility
that an agent reasons soundly according to a model of beliefs. The plan that
corresponds naturally to heuristic reasoning in the MH problem is defined from
the same evidential events and alternatives as is the previous plan. That plan is
rationalized by the model of evidence presented in example 1, amended so that
the prior probabilities are modified so that each is 1/3, along with the same utility
functions by which the heuristic plan for the BFG problem is rationalized. However,
it will be shown that the heuristic plan for the MH problem is not rational with
respect to evidence.
Consider the behavioralistic formulation of the BFG problem.
Example 5. Specify Ω, O, and E as in example 1, and let A = {e, h, f}. Specify
that ζ(Ω) = ζ(E ) = ζ(F ) = {h}.
Define a : Ω → A by a(e) = e, a(h) = h, and a(f) = f. For ω ∈ Ω and b ∈ A,
specify that
(53) ub(ω) =
{
1 if b = a(ω)
0 if b 6= a(ω)
In example 1, P ({h}) = 2/5 and P ({e}) = P ({f}) = 3/10. Consequently
P [{h} |E ] = P [{h} |F ] = 4/7. Thus the model of evidence in example 1, together
with the utility functions defined in (53), rationalize ζ with respect to evidence.
That is, on the intuitive understanding of the alternatives that was suggested above,
ζ is the plan that corresponds naturally to heuristic reasoning in the BFG problem.
Plan ζ is also rational with respect to beliefs. One way of showing that is to
appeal to the model of beliefs constructed in example 2, and to specify that, for all
φ ∈ Φ, ve(φ) = vf(φ) = 0 and vh(φ) = 1. Rationality with respect to beliefs can
also be shown by defining vb(ω,B) = ub(ω) and by modifying Q from (15) to the
following specification, which assigns very high probability to the event that h is
the state of nature.
(54)
Q(ω,B) Ω E F
e .1 .1 0
h .8 .4 .4
f .1 0 .1
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This second way has the feature that the alternatives continue to be given their
intuitive interpretations according to the assignment of utilities, rather than h being
treated as a dominant alternative.
In contrast, the way that subjects are understood to reason in Monte Hall exper-
iments suggests a plan that is rational with respect to evidence, but is not rational
with respect to beliefs.15 In its original form, the MH problem involves an agent
making a provisional choice, and subsequently having an opportunity to revise that
choice. The specification of of E ′ in example 1, which is incorporated in following
example, corresponds to the revised-choice stage of the MH problem that would
follow the agent having made h as the provisional choice.
Example 6. The example is identical to example 5, except that
(55) ζ(Ω) = A ζ(E ) = {e, h} ζ(F ) = {h, f}
Claim 3. The plan specified by (55) in example 6 is rational with respect to evi-
dence, but not with respect to beliefs.
Proof. Specify a model of evidence according to example 6, along with the spec-
ification that P (e) = P (h) = P (f) = 1/3. This model and the utility functions
defined by (53) rationlize ζ.
Now it will be shown by contradiction that there do not exist a model of beliefs,
(Φ,B, Q,Ω, E , τ) and utility functions 〈vb〉b∈A that rationalize ζ. By (48.1), since
h ∈ ζ(Ω) ∩ ζ(E ) and f ∈ ζ(Ω) \ ζ(E ),
(56)
∫
β(Ω)
vh dQ =
∫
β(Ω)
vf dQ
and
(57)
∫
β(E)
vh dQ >
∫
β(E)
vf dQ
Since β(Ω) = Ω, (56) implies that
(58)
∫
Ω
vh dQ =
∫
Ω
vf dQ
Because E ′ = {E ,F}, {β(E ), β(F )} is a partition of Ω. Therefore, (57) and (58)
imply that
(59)
∫
β(F)
vf dQ >
∫
β(F)
vh dQ
But, given condition (48.1), inequality (59) contradicts a clause of assumption (55),
that h ∈ ζ(F ). 
15Granberg and Brown (1995, pp. 711, 712) hypothesize that their subjects reason heuristically
as in example 1, in a setting tantamount to that example except that the prior probability of each
state of nature is 1/3. This prior makes the two alternatives consistent with the subject’s type to
be equal to one another in expected utility. Subjects cannot express indifference, given the forced-
choice protocol of the experiment. Granberg and Brown suggest that “intertia” or some other
tie-breaking consideration accounts for subjects’ expressed choices, implying that those choices
represent a single-valued selection from an underlying plan that is a multi-valued correspondence.
They hypothesize that some subjects may, in fact, be randomizing between the two alternatives.
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